Who said kill bush

President George Bush. He explained the reason. My client believes that Bush is interfering in Georgia's internal affairs," she said. Both Mr. Bush and Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili had been behind a bulletproof barrier addressing a rally of thousands in Tbilisi when the grenade landed about feet away.

September 27, — Save Log in , register or subscribe to save articles for later. Normal text size Larger text size Very large text size. It is to make kinder the face of the nation and gentler the face of the world. And I haven't liked it since I was a little kid and my mother made me eat it. And I'm president of the United States and I'm not going to eat any more broccoli. To make them more like the Waltons and less like the Simpsons.

Trust me, I know something about that. Emphasis added. A DOJ representative who assisted in preparing this Report told us that the FBI provided the information in this paragraph, although that DOJ representative was not sure whether the language later was massaged in some way.

The results of chemical and physical analysis of the explosive main charge from the car bomb recovered in Kuwait indicate an explosive known as PE-4A. Thus, the evidence shows that Ronay and Gallagher did understand and report that the Bush explosive and the Southeast Asia explosives contained PE-4A that the FBI could not say was chemically identical.

However, subsequent reports failed to note the possibility of chemical differences and simply reported that all of the cases involved a PE-4A plastic explosive. While these reports were not as precise as Whitehurst would have liked because they failed to discuss specific chemical differences, we find no evidence that Ronay or Gallagher purposely misreported that the explosives were chemically identical.

We also note that if the comparison results were not reported as precisely as possible, that lack of precision may have resulted from Whitehurst ' s own failure to prepare dictation reporting his findings.

Whitehurst told us that he did not prepare such dictation because the results of his comparisons were already addressed in his June 7, , dictation. In that dictation, Whitehurst reported that he had detected this type of explosive two times in the past, and then referred only to two prior Laboratory cases involving caches of explosives that the FBI could not link to Iraq.

Whitehurst ' s explanation does not justify his failure to prepare dictation. As illustrated in this case, analytical results that provide a basis for distinguishing explosives can be as meaningful as results showing that explosives are chemically identical. Whitehurst should have prepared dictation explaining that he had compared the Bush and Southeast Asia explosives and documenting chemical differences between the explosives.

Whitehurst also suggests that the United States may have launched the missile strike against the IIS Building in Baghdad as a result of his findings being misreported. Contrary to Whitehurst ' s suggestion, the decision to launch the missile strike did not turn on reports that the Bush and Southeast Asia explosives contained PE-4A. The FBI and CIA assembled extensive evidence of Iraqi involvement, including admissions from two key suspects, forensic examinations of relevant explosive devices, and intelligence from various sources.

Our investigation showed that reports that the Laboratory had found PE-4A in the Bush matter and Southeast Asia cases were not a significant part of the overall evidence against the Iraqi Government. Specifically, the evidence presented to the Administration included admissions from the two main suspects, Al-Ghazali and Al-Asadi. Each confessed during interviews with the FBI that they had participated in the plot at the direction of IIS officers.

Jawad reportedly instructed Al-Asadi to plant the cube-bomb explosives in commercial areas of Kuwait City and to guide Al-Ghazali to Kuwait University. Al-Asadi reported that Al-Ghazali later told him that Bush was the target, although Al-Ghazali disputed this assertion. Rafid allegedly told Al-Ghazali that Bush was the target of the bombing attempt. Al-Ghazali also reported that Muhammad Jawad assisted in the plot. These results consisted primarily of comparisons of components from the Bush device to other known Iraqi devices, including the Middle-East devices.

CIA technicians found that the remote-control firing devices in the Bush case closely resembled devices used in other IIS devices, including the Middle-East devices. They found that blasting caps in the Bush case had the same characteristics as those found in one of the Middle-East devices, and the detonators matched those found in the other Middle-East device and one of the Southeast Asia devices.

They further determined that the cube-bombs incorporated timing circuits and remote control firing devices containing integrated circuits used by Iraq in other devices. Likewise, FBI explosives examiner Jordan found that the makers of the Bush device and the Middle-East devices used the same basic components, including the same circuit boards, manufactured radio control units, and anodized metal container.

The circuit boards even had the same serial numbers, suggesting a single manufacturer, according to Jordan. Jordan characterized the maker ' s placement of components and soldering techniques as a signature. Jordan added that he observed in the radio-controlled receiving units the same drilled holes, wiring, component selection for incorporating an external power source, and soldering expertise.

He also observed similar heat-shrunk, textile, and plastic materials used to protect wires, along with an unusually large quantity of black electrical tape.